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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THELM i\*A:>KSCUA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
TERRA, INC.. 
LAMAR S. W.>.... . li-w 
Defendants and Appellant, I Case No. 
TERRA, INC., a U tali corporation, ' 
Cross-Claimant I 
and Appellant, 
vs 
I,AMAR S. WASESCHA, 
Cross-Defendutn. 
BRIEF ()l< AIM'HLl ANT 
Tliis is an action hrought bv plaintiff-respondent 
Waseselia against defendant-appellant 
ra, Inc. and defendant-respondent LaMar S. Wa-
vha for rescision " r ! ote and mortgage execiited by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Waseschas in favor of Terra, Inc. Terra, Inc. 
counterclaimed against Thelma Wasescha and cross 
claimed against LaMar Wasescha for foreclosure; La-
Mar Wasescha filed a counterclaim to the cross com-
plaint seeking only a refund of "excessive interest". 
The action was based on the provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (hereafter UCCC) 
and of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 
Title 15 USC Sec. 1601 et. seq. However the provisions 
of these statutes are fundamentally the same, the Utah 
act having been patterned largely after the federal act 
and rules and regulations promulgated under the fed-
eral act having been adopted by the Utah Department 
of Financial Institutions; therefore, no distinction will 
be made between the applicable laws. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
On March 4, 1974, Thelma B. Wasescha filed a 
Supplemental Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim 
alleging that in January, 1974 it became necessary for 
her to obtain a release from Terra, Inc. because she had 
to sell the mortgaged property and that therefore she 
paid to Terra, Inc. the balance due on the mortgage of 
$4,032.73. Terra, Inc. moved the Court to allow it to 
amend its answer to the Supplemental Complaint to in-
clude the defense of accord and satisfaction, but that 
motion was denied. 
2 
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At the trial, evidence and witnesses were heard by 
the court, sitting without a jury. The Court held that 
the loan transaction be rescinded and that the respond-
ent recover from the appellant all interest paid 
($2,882.73), attorney fees ($700.00) and Court costs. 
That the Counterclaim of appellant against respondent 
and its Cross-claim against defendant LaMar S. Wa-
sescha be dismissed, no cause of action. That the Count-
erclaim of defendant LaMar S. Wasescha against the 
appellant be dismissed, no cause of action. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the Law 
and Motion Division which prohibited it from asserting 
the defense of accord and satisfaction and of the Judg-
ment of the trial court to the extent that it rescinded the 
loan transaction which was the subject of the action, 
awarded Thelma Wasescha $2,882.73 plus $700.00 at-
torney fees and costs, and dismissed Terra, Inc.'s Coun-
terclaim against plaintiff Thelma Wasescha and Cross 
complaint against defendant LaMar Wasescha. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
Respondent and defendant LaMar Wasescha, her 
husband, borrowed $5,000.00 from appellant on October 
8,1970, and in connection with the transaction, executed 
a promissory note (Ex. P- l ) and a real property mort-
gage (Ex. P.-2). The real property interest mortgaged 
3 
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was respondent's interest in property at 577 North 
Hills Drive in Salt Lake City, half of the equity in 
which was owned by her ex-husband (T. 38). I t is not 
disputed that on or about January 4 of 1972 appellant 
provided a release of this mortgage and the Waseschas, 
through a transaction with Home Benefit Savings & 
Loan Association, acquired the interest in the property 
of Mrs. Wasescha's ex-husband; a new mortgage from 
the Waseschas in favor of appellant was then recorded 
after Home Benefit had perfected its security interest 
(Ex. P-3 ; T. 43). 
At the time of this transaction, Terra, Inc. did not 
comply with the disclosure requirements of the U.C. 
C.C. (70B-3-306 and 70B-5-204, Utah Code Annot. 
(1973 Pocket Supp.). However, on or about June 30, 
1971, appellant mailed to the Waseschas a Notice of 
Right of Rescision (Ex. D-12) which stated that they 
had a right to rescind the transaction until not later than 
October 11, 1970, and a Statement of Transaction (Ex. 
D-13) in connection with the disclosures required by 
70B-3-306 (T. 110). These documents were mailed by 
Terra, Inc. at the request and insistence of the Depart-
ment of Financial Institutions (T. 54). | 
Sporadic payments were made on the note, but the 
record is devoid of any clear evidence as to what amount 
was paid by Thelma Wasescha and what amount by La-
Mar Wasescha. While Thelma claimed at one point to 
have made all of the payments which were reflected in 
a payment booklet (Ex. P-5) (T. 62), these monies 
4 
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would have come from money given to her by LaMar 
to handle their joint obligations (T. 74), and LaMar 
Wasescha's testimony (by deposition) was that he "sent 
payments of $500.00" (T. 75). Mrs. Wasescha claimed 
that she had made the payments to Terra, Inc. in the 
form of money orders and checks, claimed that she had 
every single one of the cancelled checks or money order 
invoices, but stated that she had left them home because 
her attorney told her they would not be necessary (T. 
65). 
Discovery procedures continued up until approxi-
mately January 5, 1974 when respondent's attorney 
asked Alan Frandsen, Terra, Inc.'s President, for a 
payoff figure on the loan since the note was going to be 
paid by the Waseschas. Mr. Frandsen was asked what 
other items were involved and he stated that he had ex-
pended $17.16 in costs (T. 99). H e was then asked 
about attorney's fees, and replied that he would like to 
have the matter behind him and would therefore accept 
payment of the principal amount, interest and costs. 
Frandsen knew that the Waseschas were selling their 
house, but did not know why, nor did respondents at-
torney indicate to him that the money was being paid 
under protest (T. 100-101). 
On March 4, 1974, respondent, pursuant to stipu-
lation, filed a Supplemental Complaint and Reply to 
Counterclaim. On March 11, 1974, appellant moved the 
Law and Motion Court to allow it to file an amended 
answer to the Supplemental Complaint raising, among 
5 
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other defenses, that of accord and satisfaction based 
upon the Waseschas payment of the note. This motion 
was denied, although the court did grant appellant's mo-
tion to assert the defense of bar by statute of limita-
tions. 
Terra, Inc. does not maintain a separate office, all 
of its records being kept and business transacted in the 
law office of Alan Frandsen. I t does not have its name 
on the door of Frandsen's law office, is not listed in the 
telephone book nor does it have a phone in its name. I t 
did not make over two or three loans a year, did not 
solicit or in any way put itself out as a lending institu-
tion, and all of the loans it ever made had been to friends 
whom Frandsen, its President, had known throughout 
the years. I t did not have any salaried employees, and 
ninety percent of its assets were Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts purchased at a discount, the other ten percent 
of its assets being loans. Frandsen did not spend 
more than fifteen minutes to one-half hour per month 
in connection with Terra, Inc.'s operation (T. 20). 
Respondent had known Frandsen personally for 
five years, having been introduced to him by her hus-
band, defendant LaMar Wasescha. Frandsen had been 
their friend and had known both of them professionally 
and socially, and he had represented both of them as 
their attorney (T. 24). 
A trial of the action was had on March 13, 1974. 
Defendant LaMar Wasescha did not appear and was 
not represented by counsel. 
6 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E L O W E R COURT ( L A W & MOTION) 
E R R E D W H E N I T D E N I E D A P P E L L A N T ' S 
MOTION TO A M E N D I T S A N S W E R TO T H E 
S U P P L E M E N T A L COMPLAINT I N ORDER 
TO R A I S E T H E D E F E N S E O F ACCORD 
A N D SATISFACTION. 
The lower court, Law & Motion Division, by its 
Order of March 12, 1974, denied appellant's motion to 
file an amended answer to affirmatively raise the de-
fense of accord and sadsfication. It was appellant's po-
sition that the possibility of this defense was raised by 
and based upon the following facts: On or about Jan-
uary 5, 1974, respondent's attorney telephoned Alan 
Frandsen, Terra, Inc.'s president, and requested a pay-
off figure on the loan since the note was going to be 
paid by the Waseschas; after receiving this figure, he 
asked what other items were involved and Frandsen 
mentioned his $17.16 in costs; respondent's attorney 
then inquired about attorney's fees and Frandsen re-
plied that he would like to have the matter behind him 
and would therefore accept payment of the principal 
amount, interest and costs. Thereafter, Waseschas paid 
appellant the total sum of $4,032.73 on January 10, 
1974, see Statement of Facts herein. 
This was obviously a substantial defense. The clear 
implication of the conversation between Frandsen and 
respondent's attorney, by reason of the fact that the 
7 
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latter made no response to Frandsen's statement that 
he would like to have the matter behind him and would 
therefore not insist on payment of attorney fees by the 
Waseschas as a condition to clearing up the matter (as 
he had sought in his Counterclaim and Cross-com-
plaint), was that the matter was being settled. See 
Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 262 (1968). 
Appellant does not contend that it was entitled to 
have the plaintiff's complaint dismissed if the foregoing 
facts do establish an accord and satisfaction; it is here 
asking for a day in court to establish, if it can, that the 
foregoing facts constituted a meeting of the minds of 
the parties involved regarding settlement of the matter. 
There was a dispute about the amount due. The fact 
that Terra, Inc. agreed to accept less than it claimed 
was due certainly is an indication that it thought the 
matter was being settled, and at that point in time, the 
Waseschas certainly received an economic benefit since 
it was not then clear what the result of the law suit 
would be (in fact it was certainly not clear to Frandsen 
that the law suit would even be pursued; yet they were 
able to obtain the release of the mortgage which they 
desired from Terra, Inc. for substantially less money 
than it claimed was due. 
Appellant concedes that the matter of allowing 
amendments rests largely within the sound discretion 
of the trial court; Johnson v. Continental Casualty Com-
party, 78 Utah 18, 300 P . 1032. However, Rule 15, 
U.R.C.P., does provide that leave to amend "shall be 
8 
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freely given when justice so requires," and in light of 
that provision, appellant contends that here it is appar-
ent that the trial court has abused such discretion. 
The Utah case of Chaney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205, 211, 381 P.2d 86 (1963) involved a plaintiff's con-
tention that the trial court abused its discretion in allow-
ing the issue of a subsequent agreement to be raised. In 
the process of holding that the trial court not only did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the issue to be raised, 
but that it would have failed the plain mandate of 
justice had it refused to do so, the court stated, at 210: 
The view of the trial court that the Real Estate 
Exchange accepted this agreement to pay a lump 
sum, rather than any requirement of immediate 
payment, in lieu of its prior claims, is not unrea-
sonable in light of the evidence, nor is the view 
that the acceptance of such an agreement consti-
tutes an accord and satisfaction (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
The court further stated, at 211: 
(The Rules of Civil Procedure) must all be 
looked to in the light of their . . . fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and proce-
dure to the end that the parties are afforded the 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate con-
tentions they have pertaining to their dispute. 
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When 
this is accomplished, that is all that is required. 
(Citing Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corporation, 1 
Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279 (1953)). Our rules 
provide for liberality to allow examination into 
and settlement of all issues bearing upon the con-
9 
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troversy, but safeguard the rights of the other 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new 
issue if he so requests, (emphasis added). 
The substantial number of cases collected in the 
annotations to Rule 15(a) establishes beyond a doubt 
that it is the policy of Utah law that leave to amend 
should be liberally granted where there is no prejudice 
to the adverse party to the end that a full hearing may 
be had upon all phases of the controversy in the trial 
courts. Especially significant is Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 
89 Utah 530, 538, 57 P.2d 1132, in support of the prop-
osition that a more liberal rule would be applied in cases 
where amendments are offered before trial of the cause 
than when offered during or after trial. Here there is no 
showing in the record of any possible prejudicial effect 
on respondent had the trial court granted appellant's 
motion to amend. That this is so is evident from the fact 
that the trial court did allow appellant to amend its an-
swer to assert the defense of statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, it is evident that the motion to amend 
was seasonally made, and respondent cannot be heard 
to complain otherwise. The facts on which the defense 
of accord and satisfaction were based did not occur until 
January 10, 1974, yet respondent did not file her Sup-
plemental Complaint until March 6, 1974. Appellant 
stipulated to the filing of the Supplemental Complaint, 
but when its request for a stipulation from respondent 
to filing of an Amended Answer was refused, it pro-
ceeded promptly to file a motion for leave to amend, 
which motion was filed on March 6, 1974 and heard on 
March 12, 1974. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In summary, appellant contends that fundamental 
fairness required that it be given an opportunity to 
raise this defense in the trial 
P O I N T I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D W H E N I T D E -
N I E D A P P E L L A N T S MOTION TO DISMISS 
B A S E D U P O N T H E F A C T T H A T P L A I N -
T I F F D I D NOT P R O V E T H A T T H E LOAN 
U P O N W H I C H H E R ACTION W A S B A S E D 
W A S S U B J E C T TO T H E P R O V I S I O N S O F 
T H E U T A H U N I F O R M CONSUMER C R E D I T 
CODE. 
In order to establish her right to rescision, plaintiff 
had to bring the loan transaction which was the subject 
of her action within the provisions of 70B-5-204(l) of 
the Utah U.C.C.C. which provides in pertinent part that 
"in the case of a . . . consumer loan with respect to which 
a security interest is retained or acquired in an interest 
in land which is used or expected to be used as the resi-
dence of the person to whom credit is extended, the 
debtor shall have the right to rescind the transaction un-
til midnight of the third business day following the con-
sumation of the transaction or the delivery of the dis-
closures required . . . whichever is later. . . . " By reason 
of the provisions of 70B-3-104 which defines "consumer 
loan," plaintiff had to establish that the loan here in-
volved was "made by a person regularly engaged in the 
business of making loans." 
11 
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Appellant submits that neither the respondent nor 
cross defendant offered any evidence at all to establish 
that Terra, Inc. was "regularly engaged in the business 
of making loans" at the time the loan involved was made 
to the Waseschas. The only evidence in the record in 
this regard was elicited from agents of Terra, Inc., and 
may be summarized as follows (see Statement of 
Facts) : Terra, Inc. did not make more than two or 
three loans per year, and these only to friends or ac-
quaintances Frandsen, its president, had known over the 
years, did not have more than five loans total, did not 
solicit loans or hold itself out as being in the business of 
making loans, had no telephone listing or separate tele-
phone, did not have a separate office and did not have 
its name on the door; further, only ten percent of its 
assets were in the form of loan obligations, the other 
ninety percent being real estate contracts purchased at 
a discount, it had no salaried employees, and required 
only fifteen to thirty minutes per month of the time of 
its president. 
Counsel for appellant have not been able to find 
case law on the question of what "regularly engaged in 
the business of making loans" means. However, the 
trial court, in making its ruling that appellant was reg-
ularly engaged in the business of making loans, took the 
position that the volume (presumably the number of 
loans and relative portion of assets) was irrelevant. Ap-
pellant submits that the question of volume is not irrele-
vant, that respondent failed not only to prove that ap-
pellant was regularly engaged in the business of making 
12 
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loans, but that the evidence of record establishes that 
appellant was not "regularly" engaged in the business 
of making loans. 
The question of volume cannot be irrelevant be-
cause, if the legislature had intended the act to extend 
to all loan transactions in which the other elements of the 
definition of "consumer loan" are met, it would not have 
used the word "regularly" but merely would have pro-
vided that a "consumer loan is a loan made by a person 
engaged in the business of making loans." If the statute 
had been thus written, the loan here involved would 
clearly be subject to the provisions of the U.C.C.C. 
The purpose of the Code set forth in 70B-1-102 
and the provisions of Chapter 6 which provide for an-
nual notification to the Department of Financial Insti-
tutions of loan business transacted and the payment of 
fees based on volume, not only indicate that volume of 
business is not irrelevant, but are instructive as an aid in 
determining what the legislature meant by "regularly 
engaged in the business of making loans." Significant 
purposes of the U.C.C.C. are to assure an adequate 
supply of credit to consumers and to foster competi-
tion among suppliers of consumer credit. A holding 
that a business which does not hold itself out as being 
engaged in the business of making loans, does not ad-
vertise, makes no more than two or three loans a year 
and has a total of only five loans, makes loans only to 
personal friends or acquaintances of its president, and 
has an insignificant portion of its assets involved in these 
13 
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loans, is "regularly" engaged in the business of making 
loans, because of the burden imposed by the Code in the 
form of notification and reporting requirements and 
payment of fees, would have the effect of inhibiting the 
making of loans and would thus work in direct opposi-
tion to the purposes and policies of the Code of foster-
ing competition and encouraging the available supply of 
credit. 
The fact that appellant was licensed and authorized 
to make consumer credit loans does not have any special 
significance. The important point is not the impact of 
the Court's ruling on appellant, but the impact the 
Court's ruling may have, in terms of the purposes and 
policies set forth by the legislature, on the broad class of 
entities or persons who make what would otherwise be 
consumer loans but only on a casual basis. Furthermore, 
there are several valid reasons why appellant would 
comply with licensing provisions even though it was not 
"regularly engaged" in the business of making loans, 
i.e. it may have intended to become so engaged in the 
future or its officers may have merely determined that 
prudence and the avoidance of exposure to risk dictated 
the necessity of obtaining a license; see, e.g., Sec. 70B-
5-301 which provides criminal penalties for unauthor-
ized acts and transactions. 
The word "regularly" does, of course, have a rela-
tively ascertainable meaning in common useage, i.e. "at 
fixed and certain intervals, regular in point of time; in 
accordance with some consistent or periodical rule or 
14 
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practice; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1951. So also 
with the word "regular," i.e. steady or uniform in course 
or practice or occurance; antonyms of "regular" are 
"casual" and "occasional," Black's Law Dictionary, 
whereas "regular" stresses conformity to a pattern; 
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1972. 
Appellant submits that in the foregoing context 
what the legislature meant by use of the word "regular-
ly" was to exclude persons or entities who, as appellant, 
do not hold themselves out as being in the business of 
making loans and do not solicit business. 
In summary, appellant contends that the Court was 
without jurisdiction to grant the relief afforded to the 
Waseschas by the judgment herein because appellant 
was not "regularly engaged in the business of making 
loans" and therefore the provisions of the U.C.C.C. 
were not applicable to this transaction. 
POINT I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D W H E N I T 
R U L E D T H A T A P P E L L A N T S DISCLO-
S U R E S D I D NOT COMPLY W I T H T H E PRO-
VISIONS OF T H E U T A H U N I F O R M CON-
S U M E R C R E D I T CODE A N D T H E R E F O R E 
D E N I E D A P P E L L A N T S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS BASED U P O N T H E F A C T T H A T RE-
SPONDENT'S CAUSE O F ACTION W A S 
B A R R E D BY T H E T H R E E D A Y S T A T U T E 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OF L I M I T A T I O N S C O N T A I N E D I N 70B-5-
204(2) OF T H E U T A H U N I F O R M CONSUM-
E R C R E D I T CODE. 
The trial court held that the notice of right to re-
scind (Ex. D-12) was mailed by appellant and received 
by the Waseschas on or about June 30, 1971, but that 
that notice was defective and a nullity because it in-
formed the Waseschas that they had a right to cancel 
the transaction by "mail or telegram sent not later than 
midnight of October 11, 1970." The disclosure require-
ments of 70B-5-204 of the U.C.C.C. provides in per-
tinent part: "The creditor shall clearly and conspicuous-
ly disclose . . . to the debtor in a transaction subject to 
this section the rights of the debtor under this section." 
The rights of the debtor under the section are "to re-
scind the transaction until midnight of the third business 
day following the consumation of the transaction or the 
delivery of the disclosures required under this section 
and all other material disclosures required by this act, 
whichever is later. . . ." The trial court held further that 
(T. 110) the foregoing notice "wouldn't put anyone on 
notice that they still had the right to cancel," apparently 
because while the transaction closed on October 8, 1970, 
the notice of right to rescind which was mailed in June 
of 1971 stated that the Waseschas had the right to can-
cel by mail or telegram sent not later than midnight of 
October 11, 1970. The trial court further ruled at (T. 
117) that the statement of transaction (Ex. D-13) 
"wasn't timely and, therefore was a nullity." 
16 
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Appellant contends that the trial court committed 
obvious error in ruling that the statement of transaction 
was a nullity because it wasn't timely. The statement of 
transaction dealt with the uother material disclosures" 
required by the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and 
assuming that the disclosures required by 70B-5-204 
had been made, the three day period during which the 
Waseschas had to rescind the transaction would start to 
run on the date that the "other material disclosures re-
quired by the act" were delivered. There is nothing in 
that section which could conceivably justify a ruling 
that by not being "timely" the statement of transaction 
containing the required disclosures was a "nullity." On 
the contrary, that language implies that it is permissible 
to make "untimely" disclosures, the only consequence 
being that the debtor retains the right to rescind until 
three days after required disclosures are made. Further, 
the evident policy of the U.C.C.C. is that a creditor 
should suffer no disability for untimeliness if proper 
disclosures are eventually made; see, e.g., 70B-5-203(2) 
which provides: 
A creditor has no liability under this section 
if within fifteen days after discovering an error 
and prior to the institution of an action under this 
section or the receipt of written notice of the 
error, the creditor notifies the person concerned 
of the error and makes whatever adjustments in 
the appropriate account are necessary. . . . " 
The only issue which the trial court should have 
considered, therefore, is the question of whether or not 
the notice of right to rescind which was mailed on June 
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30, 1971, substantially complied with the requirements 
of Section 70B-5-204(l). Appellant contends that the 
notice did substantially comply with the requirement of 
that section that it disclose to the Waseschas their right 
to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third 
business day following the delivery of disclosures re-
quired. The trial court concluded that because the notice 
informed the Waseschas they had a right to rescind "by 
mail or telegram sent not later than midnight of October 
11, 1970, but was delivered on June 30, 1971, the notice 
would not put anyone on notice that they still had the 
right to cancel. Appellant submits that that conclusion 
is contrary to everyday experience and common sense. 
Had the Waseschas been interested in rescinding the 
transaction in June of 1971 when they received the no-
tice, it is only sensible that upon the receipt of a docu-
ment saying anything at all about their having a right 
to cancel, they would have made further inquiries either 
of appellant or of their attorney. Yet the Waseschas did 
not contact appellant to inquire about a right to rescind, 
and respondent apparently did not contact her attorney 
regarding the transaction until the expiration of some 
two years from the date the court found they received 
the notice, inasmuch as the complaint herein is dated 
June 13, 1973. It is also significant that even at that 
time, as shown by the complaint herein, respondent 
sought rescision only of the mortgage and a setoff (on 
amounts which the court determined she owed appel-
lant) on account of excessive interest charges which she 
alleged had been collected by appellant. Of further spe-
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cial significance is the relief she sought in paragraph 4 
of the prayer of the complaint, to-wit: "for a declaration 
that at the time said note becomes due, plaintiff and de-
fendant LaMar S. Wasescha shall have the right to re-
finance the same, without penalty, at terms no less fa-
vorable than the terms of the original transaction (em-
phasis added)." Even at that time, respondent was not 
interested in rescision, because the terms of the original 
transaction included provisions for payment by her of 
a finance charge. 
In light of the foregoing, appellant submits that 
the trial court should have made a finding that the Wa-
seschas received the notice of right to rescind, that the 
notice was in substantial compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of 70B-5-204, that the Waseschas had a 
right to rescind the transaction only for a period of 
three days from their receipt of the notice on or about 
June 30, 1971, and that the action for rescision was 
therefore barred by reason of the fact that it was not 
filed until approximately two years after their receipt 
of the notice. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E F I N D I N G S A R E NOT S U P P O R T E D BY 
T H E E V I D E N C E AND T H E J U D G M E N T IS 
NOT S U P P O R T E D BY T H E F I N D I N G S I N 
T H A T T H E RECORD D O E S NOT D I S C L O S E 
T H E A M O U N T OF I N T E R E S T P A I D BY R E -
SPONDENT. 
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If the Waseschas were entitled to rescind the trans-
action, what they were entitled to was a refund of any 
loan finance charge which they had paid. "When a 
debtor exercises his right to rescind under subsection 
(1), he is not liable for any . . . loan finance charge. . . ." 
70B-5-204(2). Subsection (2) further provides that the 
Waseschas were obligated to repay the principal amount 
of the loan. The Findings of Fact herein (paragraphs 
11 and 12) are that appellant received a total of $7,-
882.73 from the Waseschas in connection with the loan; 
since the principal amount of the loan was $5,000.00, the 
difference of $2,882.73 represents the finance charge 
which respondent was "not liable for." I t is evident that 
the judgment awarded respondent was intended to be 
the total amount of interest paid on the loan because the 
amount of that judgment is that exact figure. 
Initially, it is obvious that the judgment herein is 
not supported by the Findings of Fact, at least to the 
extent of $500.00. In paragraph 11 of its Findings, the 
court found that plaintiff paid to appellant the sum of 
$3,350.00, and that "prior to January 11, 1972, the sum 
of $500.00 had been paid to defendant Terra, Inc., for 
application on the consumer loan;" in paragraph 12 of 
its findings, the court found that plaintiff paid to Terra, 
Inc. the sum of $4,032.73. Since the court's findings as 
to plaintiff were that she had paid to appellant only 
$7,382.73, and were silent as to what portion of that 
amount was "loan finance charge," she would at most be 
entitled to recover the sum of $2,382.73. Neither can the 
Findings be corrected by mere housekeeping amend-
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ments. The record clearly establishes that, while at one 
point respondent claimed that she made all of the pay-
ments (T. 62), at least the amount of $500.00 was not 
paid by her. This is established from the testimony of 
defendant LaMar Wasescha, whose testimony plaintiff 
is bound by because she had his deposition published in 
her case in chief. His testimony, at T. 75, was as fol-
lows: "From that day forward . . . I personally did— 
now this was during the time that I handled the fi-
nances, and I sent payments of $500.00 as I remember.'' 
The foregoing testimony inserted into the record 
by respondent establishes another $500.00 error in the 
Judgment and Findings. "Payment" of $500.00 neces-
sarily means more than one payment; therefore, the de-
fendant LaMar Wasescha must have paid at least 
$1,000.00, the most that respondent could have paid 
would have been $6,882.73; and the most she would have 
been entitled to recover would have been $1,882.73. 
Thelma could only be entitled to recover the finance 
charge she had paid, and the record simply does not dis-
close what that amount was. At the very least, appellant 
is entitled to a reduction in the judgment awarded re-
spondent against it in the sum of $1,000.00; however, 
appellant further submits that it is necessary to remand 
the case for further proceedings to determine not only 
the exact amount paid by respondent, but how much of 
that amount was finance charge as opposed to repay-
ment of principal. This is made even more necessary be-
cause the record does not reflect who made the final 
payment on the note. Respondent's testimony was that 
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"we had to sell the house" (T. 32), Defendant LaMar 
Wasescha testified he acquired an interest in the prop-
erty, and the Court's Finding of Fact (No. 12) was that 
$4,032.73 was paid to appellant from the proceeds of 
the sale of the property, so that some of the $4,032.73 
had to be proceeds from LaMar's interest. 
POINT V 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N R U L I N G 
T H A T A P P E L L A N T W A S NOT E N T I T L E D 
TO I N T E R E S T ON T H E P A S T D U E POR-
T I O N OF T H E I N D E B T E D N E S S . 
70B-5-204, the section upon which the Judgment 
awarded plaintiff herein was based, merely provides 
that when a debtor exercises his right to rescind, he is 
not liable for any loan finance charge. The section says 
nothing whatsoever about what amount a creditor must 
refund. I t is undisputed in this case that the Waseschas 
had the use of the money for a lengthy period of time 
and that substantial portions of the principal were not 
paid when due; it is equally clear that the Waseschas 
will be unjustly enriched unless the Court allows a six 
percent offset. 
In Utah, "interest is allowed on debts overdue even 
if there is no statute providing for interest (citation 
omitted). And the question has been settled (in Utah) 
in favor of the allowance of interest on debts overdue 
(citation omitted). Wasatch Mining Co. v. Cresent 
Mining Co., 7 Utah 8, 24 P.2d 586, affd, 151 U.S. 317, 
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38 L.Ed. 177, 14 S.Ct. 348; see also Crown Industries, 
Inc. v. Boyertown Burial Casket Company, 300 1 2(1 
809 (6th Cir. 1962), 70B-5-204 merely provides that a 
debtor entitled to rescision is not liable for any "lonr fi-
nance charge" and other provisions of the U C ( ( -i tv. 
therefore, pertinent. 
70B-1-103 provides that unless displaced by par-
ticular provisions of the U.C.C.C., principles of law and 
equity, including the law relative to estoppel, shall sup-
plement the provisions of the U.C.C.C. Appellant sub-
mits that 70B-5-204, which merely provides that a 
debtor entitled to rescisioiI is not liable l'< i -u-\ lu.-m fi-
nance charge, does not displace the foregoing general 
rule of Utah law that interest is allowed on debts over-
due because "loan finance charge" is defined by 70B-3-
109 as meaning the sum of (a) all charges payable di-
rectly or indirectly by the debtor and imposed directly or 
indirectly by the lendor as an incident to the extension of 
credit, and (b) charges incurred f« v investigating the 
collateral or creditworthiness of th* debtor, elr Tin-
term does not include charges as a result of default or 
delinquency charges. Applying the foregoing equitable 
rule of Utah law regarding award of six percent interest 
on debts overdue would not displace any specific pro-
visions of the U.C.C.C. because the charge would not be 
imposed upon the debtor as an incident l*. thv extension 
of credit, but would be imposed as an SIH-KIUP fn flu* 
fact that the Waseschas did not pay ihe -»t< i^n in-
volved as they had contracted to do. 
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I t is therefore necessary to remand the case for 
further proceedings at least to determine which pay-
ments made by the Waseschas were overdue and for 
what period of time they were overdue. 
Appellant, therefore, contends that the trial court 
erred in denying its motion to amend the judgment 
herein to allow appellant an offset (against amounts 
awarded to plaintiff) in the sum of six percent interest 
on the delinquent portion of payments due on the loan 
which is the subject of this action. 
P O I N T VI 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D W H E N I T 
R U L E D T H A T T H E D E F E N D A N T LAMAR 
W A S E S C H A W A S E N T I T L E D TO RESCI -
SION. 
First, and most obviously, LaMar Wasescha did 
not seek rescision. Paragraph one of the prayer for re-
lief of his Counterclaim reflects that the relief he was 
seeking was that "excessive interest charges collected 
by cross-claimant from plaintiff and this defendant be 
setoff against any amounts found to be due to cross-
claimant." The basis of the trial court's ruling was 
that the prayer of his Counterclaim also sought "such 
other and further relief as the court shall deem equit-
able," and that it would not "accomplish anything—if 
he has to come in and defend on interest and ask for in-
terest, that is sufficient. I t doesn't matter what amount 
it is. I don't think it's necessary. H e can have rescision 
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as far as lie is concerned. He's justified in coming in <-im! 
defending, and he is entitled to consideration by JVJIM)M 
—so your motion is denied 'T "M.V "HfO " 
Counsel for respondent h.iii ;n(i»ia'» '!,.\ -hi =n 
defendant, the husband of respondent, was entitle.: n* 
rescision even though he had not sought it, by reason of 
the provisions of Sec. 226.9, C.F.R., otherwise known 
as Regulation Z, which was adopted by reference by the 
State Department of Financial Institutions on July 1, 
1969, dealing with joint ownership. Counsel correctly 
quoted that provision, as follows: " (f) For the purpose 
of this section, 'customer' shall include two n moir cus-
tomers where joint ownership is involved, and fhr fol-
lowing shall apply: 
1. The right of rescision of the transaction may be 
exercised by any one of them, in which case the effect of 
rescision in accordance with paragraph (d) of this sec-
tion applies to all of them. , , ." 
Counsel's problem, however, is that that provision is 
not applicable to the facts in this case because at the 
time of the transaction, defendant LaMar Wasesclia 
mas not a joint owner of the property involved t T /.">. 
43, 72; Deposition of LaMar Wasescha, i 0 H* ,jjd 
not acquire his interest i mtil January of 1972 w iim hr-
and respondent, through a financing transaction at 
Home Benefit Savings & Loan, purchased the equity 
interest of respondent's ex-husband. 
Because LaMar Wasescha did not seek rescision, 
question arises whether he was otherwise entitled to 
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rescision in light of the provisions of Rule 54(c), U.R. 
C.P., which provides that every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. The instant record does not, 
and of course could not by reason of his failure to ap-
pear for trial, reflect that the defendant LaMar Wa-
sescha is entitled to rescision. How can it be said that a 
defendant is entitled to a relief or remedy which he does 
not affirmatively seek at some point in the proceedings, 
if not expressly then at least by implication? Further-
more, even if it could be said that defendant LaMar 
Wasescha was entitled to rescision based on the record, 
it would still be necessary that the pleadings be amend-
ed to conform to the record. However, in order to be 
able to amend his pleadings, the defendant would have 
to comply with the provisions of Rule 15 (b), U.R.C.P., 
which provides that: "Such liberal amendments shall be 
allowed if the issue is tried by the express or implied 
consent of the parties, (emphasis added)." It is evident 
that the defendant LaMar Wasescha did not consent to 
trial of the issue of rescision, either expressly or by im-
plication, because he failed to appear at the trial. Nor 
could respondent, the wife of the person she had sued as 
a defendant, give the necessary consent for him. The 
complete absence of a party from the trial proceedings 
certainly is a much stronger situation for establishing 
lack of consent than that which was involved in National 
Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company v. 
Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 13, 286 P.2d 49 (1959). That 
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ease involved a situation where the plaintiff was at-
tempting to recover $1,000.00 it had paid to defendant 
for a fire insurance policy. The jury had found the 
value of the building to be $2,000.00 but the trial court 
entered an order providing for a new trial in the event 
the defendant failed to file a consent to a reduction to 
$1,000.00 within ten days. On the tenth day, the defend-
ant filed a motion to set aside that order, at *IK same 
time as the clerk file*.! At-, order granting a new trial. 
Thereafter, the trial mu» t made and entered a new order 
vacating the first order and reinstating the jury's find-
ing that the value of the building was $2,000.00. In its 
pleadings the defendant had alleged the value of the 
building to be $2,000.00 and the plaintiff had admitted 
that figure in its pleadings. At trial, the defendant test-
ified that in connection with a sale of some property he 
was to receive an additional $1,000.00 if the building 
was included. The Supreme Court held that that testi-
mony did not amount to consent. Taylor v. E. M. Royle 
Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279 (1953) involved a 
situation where the plaintiff plead and attempted to 
prove an express contract, sought no amendment of his 
pleadings nor demanded no relief and urged no claim 
under a quantim meruit or other theory, but was 
granted recovery by the trial court on a contract implied 
in law. In answering the question whether this was 
proper, the court cited Morris v. Russell, Utah, 236 
P.2d 451, 455, wherein it was stated: "The adding of 
the quantim meruit count, was the equivalent of per-
mitting an amendment to conform to the proof " Tl le 
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court in Taylor then stated: "Here the record indicates 
that the plaintiff had an express contract in mind, not 
one implied in law. Plaintiff sought no change in theory 
by way of pleading or proof." 
So to in the instant case. Here the defendant La-
Mar Wasescha had in mind and sought recovery of 
excess interest, not rescision and recovery of all interest. 
H e sought no change in theory by way of pleading or 
proof, since he did not appear at the trial and no proof 
was adduced on his behalf at all. 
P O I N T V I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D W H E N I T 
R U L E D T H A T A P P E L L A N T WAS NOT E N -
T I T L E D TO B E A W A R D E D A T T O R N E Y S 
F E E S FROM D E F E N D A N T L A M A R S. WA-
S E S C H A ON I T S CROSSCLAIM. 
Because defendant LaMar Wasescha was not in 
default, his failure to appear at the trial did not entitle 
appellant to a default judgment against him; Rule 
55(a) (1), U.R.C.P. However, it is not disputed that 
he did receive notice of the trial (T. 3), and therefore 
the court followed the proper course in proceeding, at 
the time the case was regularly called for trial, to hear 
the evidence and enter a judgment on the merits based 
upon the record. The record as to the cross claim of ap-
pellant against defendant LaMar Wasescha clearly re-
flects that the promissory note was substantially past 
due at the time the action was instituted (Ex. P- l , Ex. 
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F-5). By reason of his absence, of course, defendant 
LaMar Wasescha adduced no evidence whatsoever, and 
appellant therefore contends thai it was entitled *• a 
judgment on the merits for attorney's fees against the 
defendant LaMar Wasescha. Nor can it be said that the 
trial court did not commit error in denying appellant's 
motion to amend the judgment herein to provide for an 
award of attorney's fees against LaMar Wasescha on 
the ground that "to be consistent, I have got to deny 
your motion as to attorney's fees. , , l: ]- M ' ! nmlhT 
what amount it is, I don't think it's necessary, he can 
have rescision as far as he is concerned. H e is justified 
in coming in and defending, and he is entitled to con-
sideration by reason—so your motion is denied (T. 
116)." This is so because since defendant Wasescha did 
not seek rescision, the record is devoid of any evidence 
that he (as opposed to respondent) is entitled ! nsci-
sion, and even if it did, he cannot now aiumd :H\ pU-ad-
ings to conform to the record since he did not consent to 
trial of the issue whether he was entitled to rescision, 
either expressly or by implicatioi i 
Appellant therefore submits that it was and is en-
titled to judgment against defendant LaMar Wasescha 
in the sum of $1,800.00 which the record reflects to be a 
reasonable amount (T. 101). 
P O I N T V I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N A W A R D I N G 
R E S P O N D E N T A T T O R N E Y ' S F E E S F R O M 
A P P E L L A N T . 
Hj, 
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As has heretofore been shown, the trial court based 
relief which it granted respondent upon Sec. 70B-5-204 
of the U.C.C.C. That section makes no provision for 
attorney's fees. On the other hand, when the legislature 
intended to confer a right to recover attorney's fees, it 
specifically so stated, see e.g. 70B-5-203(l) (b), and re-
ferred to relief granted under specific sections and para-
graphs. Since an award of attorney's fees must be based 
on statute or agxeement, at least that portion of the 
judgment awarding respondent $700.00 attorney fees 
should be reversed. 
P O I N T I X 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N F A I L I N G 
TO F I N D AS A F A C T T H A T AS A M A T T E R 
OF L A W R E S P O N D E N T A N D D E F E N D A N T 
L A M A R W A S E S C H A W A I V E D T H E R I G H T 
TO R E S C I N D . 
Section 70E-1-107 of the U.C.C.C. deals with 
Waiver, Agreement to Forego Rights, and Settlement 
of Claims. The comments to that section of the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, after noting that 
waiver is specifically provided for in some sections of 
the U.C.C.C, state that in the absence of such a specific 
provision, "waiver or agreement to forego must be part 
of a settlement, and settlements are subject to review 
by the court." In this action appellant contends that the 
Waseschas waived, as part of just such a settlement 
made on their behalf by their attorney, any right to re-
scind which they may have had. The facts constituting 
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the settlement, set forth, !. d*!:.'*
 af 5 supra, were 
\h.y- the attorney telephoned Alan Frandsen, Terra, 
Inc.'s president, and requested a payoff figure on the 
loan since the note was going to be paid by the Wa-
seschas. Mr. Frandsen was asked what other items were 
involved and he stated that he had expended $17.16 in 
costs. When asked about attorney's fees, he replied that 
he would like to have the matter behind him and wotilci 
therefore accept payment of the principal amount, in-
terest and costs. Respondent subsequently asserted, in 
her Supplemental Complaint, a claim that the money 
was paid under some sort of economic duress, but at the 
time the money was paid, the attorney only indicated 
that the Waseschas wanted a release of the mortgage 
and gave no indication that the money was being paid 
under protest or with a reservation of rights. In this 
<*o**tnrtinii, the provisions of 15-4-4, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953) and Rule 67 U.R.C.P. are instructive by anal-
ogy. The former provides that in the circumstance where 
an obligee wishes to release one of several obligors and 
reserve rights against the others, he must do so express-
ly in writing and as part of the same transaction as the 
release. 11" Waseschas* attorney 1 lad not intended to 
waive, he could have expressly reserved the right of re-
cision in writing, or he could have deposited the money 
in court. The obvious implication and tenor of his con-
duct was that the matter was being settled, and Frand-
sen's testimony was clear that he thought the matter was 
being settled or he would have insisted upon payment of 
attorney's fees (T. 100). 
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Payment of the note in and of itself, without any 
indication of protest or reservation or rights, amounts to 
a waiver. The fact that after payment respondent as-
serted a claim of payment under economic duress cannot 
change things, and is the sort of after the fact creation 
which this court commented on in Woodward v. Allen, 
1 Utah 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953), where the court con-
cluded that the defendant's objections to a transaction 
were conceived after he stopped payment on a check for 
a down payment and were designed to avoid a bargain 
regretted. Here, if the claim was not designed after the 
fact, the misleading nature of the implications made 
(with obvious intent to mislead) should estop the Wa-
seschas from asserting there was no waiver. 
P O I N T X 
70B-5-204 O F T H E U T A H U N I F O R M CON-
S U M E R CODE IS U N C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L Y 
VAGUE. 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." A person ex-
tending credit, in order to determine whether the pro-
visions of 70B-5-204 are applicable to the transaction, 
must make a determination as to whether or not he is 
"regularly engaged in the business of making loans" be-
cause that section applies to making a "consumer loan" 
which is defined by 70B -3-401 as being "a loan made by 
a person regularly engaged in the business of making 
loans" in which (additional elements omitted). If the 
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word regularly" as used in 7GB-3-104 is not construed 
to be its meaning in everyday, common usage (as dis-
cussed in Point I I herein), so as to exclude appellant 
from the provisions of the U.C.C.C., then the making of 
such a determination is impossible because the legisla-
ture did not adequately define the word. I t is obvious 
that the effect of 70B-5-204 has been to deprive appel-
lant of property, i.e. the money judgment rendered 
herein, and it is a fundamental proposition of constitu-
tional law requiring no citation of authority that such a 
deprivation is unconstitutional unless the person being 
deprived has adequate and reasonable notice of what 
conduct will subject him to the deprivation; see, how-
ever, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 
92 L.Ed. 840 (1948). 
am ( ::i i TSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant requests this 
court to reverse the judgment and findings of the trial 
court and, in the alternative, to remand for a new trial 
consistent with the rulings of this court or dismiss the 
complaint. 
Respectful ly submitted, 
R I C H A R D M. DAY of 
M E R E D I T H , B A R B E R AND D A Y 
455 South Third East 
S:iit Lnkr UiU Utah 84111 
AJLAiN U. J L i i A l \ J J M \ 
353 East Fourth South 
^ U Lake Uil\, Utah Hill i 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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